If DDoSing a blog wasn't bad enough, archive site also tampered with web snapshots.
original, saw this somewhere else too. ddos stuff. this one blames ru for archive.today mess. sounds about right. didn’ intend it to look like an announcement here. it kind of did. post based on ars story, apparently. who knows
He only modified archived pages in response to a dox attempt?
And the thing is, the discovery of the modified pages revealed that it wasn’t even the first time he’d modified pages. And he used a real person’s identity to try and shift blame.
Irrespective of the doxxing allegations, if he’s done all this multiple times already, it means the page archives can’t be trusted AND there’s no guarantee that anything archived with the service will be available tomorrow.
Seems like we need to switch to URLs that contain the SHA256 of the page they’re linking to, so we can tell if anything has changed since the link was created.
Only works for archived pages though, because for any regular page, a large portion of the page will be dynamically generated; hashing the HTML will only say the framework hasn’t changed.
You would need a way of verifying that the SHA256 is a true copy of the site at the time though and not a faked page. You could do something like have a distributed network of archives that coordinate archival at the same time and then using the SHA256 then be able to see which archives fetched exactly the same page at the same time through some search functionality. I mean if addons are already being used for doing the crawling then we may be mostly there already since said addons would just need to certify their archive and after that they can discard the actual copy of the page. You need need a way to validate those workers though since a bad actor could just run a whole bunch at the same time to legitimise a fake archival.
The idea is to verify the archival copy’s URL, not to verify the original content. So yes, a server could push different content to the archiver than to people, or vary by region, or an AitM could modify the content as it goes out to the archiver. But adding the sha256 in the URL query parameter means that if someone publishes a link to an archive copy online, anyone else using the link can know they’re looking at the same content the other person was referencing.
If the archive content changes, that URL will be invalid; if someone uses a fake hash, the URL will be invalid (which is why MD5 wouldn’t be appropriate).
The beauty of this technique is that query parameters are generally ignored if unsupported by the web server, so any archival service could start using this technique today, and all it would require is a browser extension to validate the parameter.
Link it to something like Web of Trust, and you’ve solved the separate issue you described.
In fact, this is a feature WoT could add to their extension today, and it would “Just Work”. For that matter, Archive.org could add it to their extension today, too.
Seems like we need to switch to URLs that contain the SHA256 of the page they’re linking to, so we can tell if anything has changed since the link was created.
He only modified archived pages in response to a dox attempt?
And the thing is, the discovery of the modified pages revealed that it wasn’t even the first time he’d modified pages. And he used a real person’s identity to try and shift blame.
Irrespective of the doxxing allegations, if he’s done all this multiple times already, it means the page archives can’t be trusted AND there’s no guarantee that anything archived with the service will be available tomorrow.
Seems like we need to switch to URLs that contain the SHA256 of the page they’re linking to, so we can tell if anything has changed since the link was created.
Actually a pretty good idea.
Only works for archived pages though, because for any regular page, a large portion of the page will be dynamically generated; hashing the HTML will only say the framework hasn’t changed.
You would need a way of verifying that the SHA256 is a true copy of the site at the time though and not a faked page. You could do something like have a distributed network of archives that coordinate archival at the same time and then using the SHA256 then be able to see which archives fetched exactly the same page at the same time through some search functionality. I mean if addons are already being used for doing the crawling then we may be mostly there already since said addons would just need to certify their archive and after that they can discard the actual copy of the page. You need need a way to validate those workers though since a bad actor could just run a whole bunch at the same time to legitimise a fake archival.
The idea is to verify the archival copy’s URL, not to verify the original content. So yes, a server could push different content to the archiver than to people, or vary by region, or an AitM could modify the content as it goes out to the archiver. But adding the sha256 in the URL query parameter means that if someone publishes a link to an archive copy online, anyone else using the link can know they’re looking at the same content the other person was referencing.
If the archive content changes, that URL will be invalid; if someone uses a fake hash, the URL will be invalid (which is why MD5 wouldn’t be appropriate).
The beauty of this technique is that query parameters are generally ignored if unsupported by the web server, so any archival service could start using this technique today, and all it would require is a browser extension to validate the parameter.
Link it to something like Web of Trust, and you’ve solved the separate issue you described.
In fact, this is a feature WoT could add to their extension today, and it would “Just Work”. For that matter, Archive.org could add it to their extension today, too.
Remind me to ping Jason about that.
IPFS says hi
Yes; the problem IPFS has is the same problem IPv6 has.
The hash-in-a-URL solution can function cleanly in the background on top of what people already use.
IPFS has gateways though, so you can link to the latest version of a page which can be updated by the owner, or alternatively link to a specific revision of the page that is immutable and can’t be forged.