They may also publicly announce it somewhere. I haven’t gone looking. I don’t know if they care about keeping their location private or not.
https://legal.lemmy.world/tos/#our-governing-laws
The website and the agreement will be governed by and construed per the laws of the following countries and/or states:
- The Netherlands
- Republic of Finland
- Federal Republic of Germany
They could write whatever they want there, but that’s probably a pretty decent argument that the server’s in Europe.
I imagine that if there’s some way to induce a Lemmy server to perform an outbound connection to a host that one controls and it isn’t specially set up to use a VPN or something, that might expose its IP. Like, might be a way to do that via ActivityPub federation activity or something; I don’t know if that was designed around avoiding that.
IIRC lemmy.dbzer0.com explicitly does try to keep its location private, so I imagine that they’re relying on Lemmy not to expose its location. I don’t know whether @[email protected] has looked hard at whether the Lemmy codebase is set up specifically not to do that, but he might have some familiarity with the topic, since I imagine that it’d be of interest to him.
For anything behind a reverse proxy network like CloudFlare, you could probably do something like measure access times from different CloudFlare points around the world and measure latency; that won’t give an exact address, but it’d probably let you home in on the general location. Probably some way to get a tcpdump of a TCP connection and do some kinda timestamp analysis that measures something like minimum time until an ACK packet is reflected in packet transmission or something like that; that’d cut stuff like connection setup time out of the question.
I remember thinking about how to identify the Jia Tan attacker some time back — that entity was always behind a VPN, as I understand it — and I remember thinking that if one knew that they were malicious before they broke off, one way would be traffic analysis on logged connections. If one has some idea of congestion on various international network links, it’s probably possible to get an effective statistical timestamp by analyzing packet response times on a TCP connection. If the unknown source has correlation in latency with latency on a given network link, then it becomes increasingly-likely that their connection, on the other side of the VPN, is traversing that link. Then walk back up potential network links, looking for statistical latency correlation with them. For smaller network links, could even briefly induce saturation yourself to accelerate generating a statistically-meaningful “latency fingerprint”.
Probably intelligence agencies and security researchers and suchlike that have done research on “piercing the VPN veil” via traffic analysis.











In The Cuckoo’s Egg, Cliff Stoll (correctly) identified that a German hacker working for the KGB attacking his systems in Berkeley, California and bouncing through intermediate systems was likely in Europe, based just on a round-trip latency measurement of Kermit responses, which is a lot more primitive than the above: