• Natanael@infosec.pub
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    2 days ago

    There are hardware for that called hardware security modules, but yeah I definitely wouldn’t trust Twitter’s implementation - especially because they probably just need the auth team to tell the HSM that the user logged in when they didn’t to get that key

    A proper implementation would use multiple security measures and require a reset (delete) of certain private account data before the account access can be reset, otherwise the user’s password would be needed (for key derivation) or some other secret held by the user’s devices (in the TPM chip or equivalent)

      • Natanael@infosec.pub
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        2 days ago

        I’ve run a cryptography forum for 10 years. I can tell snake oil from the real deal.

        Musk’s Twitter doesn’t know how to do key distribution. The only major company using HSMs the way Musk intends to is Apple, and they have far more and much more experienced cryptographers than X does.

        • FreedomAdvocate@lemmy.net.au
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          1 day ago

          So again - you just don’t want it to be true, and you think the people that know more than you about it are lying.

              • Natanael@infosec.pub
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                4 hours ago

                If you can’t demonstrate that you know more about cryptography then me, it’s time for you to admit you’re wrong

                • FreedomAdvocate@lemmy.net.au
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                  3 hours ago

                  You said this

                  There are hardware for that called hardware security modules, but yeah I definitely wouldn’t trust Twitter’s implementation - especially because they probably just need the auth team to tell the HSM that the user logged in when they didn’t to get that key

                  So again - you’re just hoping that they’ve done it wrong, based on nothing other than you wanting them to have done it wrong. They’ve told you they did, but you don’t believe them based on…nothing…nothing whatsoever…other than your hatred.

                  Feel free to tell me how your knowledge of cryptography proves that it’s done incorrectly though. Please.

                  • Natanael@infosec.pub
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                    29 minutes ago

                    This is incoherent bullshit.

                    You’re choosing to pretend it’s nothing so you can dismiss legitimate criticism.

                    An engineer hearing about some novice trying to build a plane using difficult methods that only one or two companies with immense expertise has succeeded at would be correct to assume that plane would be unsafe.

                    A doctor hearing about a tiny clinic attempting treatments that only big medical research facilities have pulled off are correct to assume they’re charlatans.

                    A cryptographer hearing about somebody attempting to build E2EE using methods that very few are capable of implementing correctly and without having the expertise on hand are correct to call that snakeoil.

                    Cryptography is INFAMOUSLY complex. E2EE is infamously difficult to make easy (“Johnny still can’t encrypt”). The worst part is that cryptographic failures are almost always 100% silent!

                    There’s a reason almost everybody copies Signal’s protocol, and that everybody else who does it in-house keeps having vulnerabilities.

                    Multi user key management (PKI) specifically is wildly complex.

                    They’re doing cryptography in the browser - famously difficult to make it work decently because there’s no reliable code pinning solution, no reliable protected key storage (no TPM protected keystore) and absolutely no auditability. And that’s on top of the risk of getting served malicious Javascript via XSS attacks, or by the host getting hacked, or by a maliciously issued certificate (there’s 800+ certificate authorities, FYI, no cert pinning = easy for a state level actor to MITM)

                    They’re not doing transparency logs of user keys. Even whatsapp has started doing that.

                    I haven’t seen evidence of them attempting user key verification

                    Twitter/X has only displayed signs of LACKING the necessary expertise.

                    To pretend that’s wishful thinking from me just reveals how little you care about expertise.